Were we terrorists? History, terrorism, and the French Resistance by Chris, Millington
 Cronfa -  Swansea University Open Access Repository
   
_____________________________________________________________
   
This is an author produced version of a paper published in:
History Compass
                                  
   
Cronfa URL for this paper:
http://cronfa.swan.ac.uk/Record/cronfa37802
_____________________________________________________________
 
Paper:
Millington, C. (2018).  Were we terrorists? History, terrorism, and the French Resistance. History Compass, e12440
http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/hic3.12440
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_____________________________________________________________
  
This item is brought to you by Swansea University. Any person downloading material is agreeing to abide by the terms
of the repository licence. Copies of full text items may be used or reproduced in any format or medium, without prior
permission for personal research or study, educational or non-commercial purposes only. The copyright for any work
remains with the original author unless otherwise specified. The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium
without the formal permission of the copyright holder.
 
Permission for multiple reproductions should be obtained from the original author.
 
Authors are personally responsible for adhering to copyright and publisher restrictions when uploading content to the
repository.
 
http://www.swansea.ac.uk/library/researchsupport/ris-support/ 
 1 
 
Title:  
Were we terrorists? History, terrorism, and the French Resistance 
 
Abstract:  
This article argues that scholars of historical terrorism should abandon the practice of 
defining the phenomenon in favour of prioritising past understandings of terrorist violence.  
Research into the history of terrorism often uses a definition informed by contemporary 
concerns to reveal previous incidents and outbreaks of terrorism.  This approach speaks more 
to the concerns of the present than those of the past.  We must refocus our attention on how 
people in history understood terrorism, and to whom and to what they applied the term.  This 
approach can open avenues of investigation into neglected or sensitive subjects, with the 
example of the violence of the French Resistance explored here.  Historians have rejected the 
use of the term ‘terrorism’ to describe Resistance action, preferring instead to use military or 
paramilitary terminology.  However, Resistance violence was understood in several ways and 
the resisters’ own rejection of the terrorist label was not total. 
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What links the assassination of Julius Caesar in 44 BCE, the Allied bombing of German cities 
during the Second World War, and the destruction of the World Trade Center on 11 
September 2001?  The answer is that all three acts may be understood as terrorism, at least 
according to the scholarly literature on the subject.  The twenty-first-century reader needs 
little convincing of the fact that Al-Qaeda’s hijacking of several passenger jets and their 
subsequent use as missiles against the Twin Towers and the Pentagon was a terrorist act.  To 
convince the reader that Caesar’s assassins and the pilots of the RAF and the USAF were 
terrorists is a little more difficult.   
Much depends on one’s definition of terrorism.  Violence described as terrorist has 
taken many forms, and has been committed around the world by an array of groups and 
individuals.  But what is terrorism?  The answer to this question may seem straightforward: 
we know terrorism when we see it.1 However, in the scholarly literature, to arrive at a 
definition that speaks to all forms of terrorism, not just the most recent occurrences, has 
proved problematic.  Walter Laqueur concluded in 1977 that the search for a definition of 
terrorism that could account for its many varieties would prove fruitless (Laqueur, 2012). 
Nevertheless, researchers from many academic disciplines have formulated at least 260 
definitions of terrorism (Schmid, 2012; Schmid, 2011; Jackson, 2008).  Attempts to arrive at 
a consensus definition have encountered difficulties.  Alex P. Schmid’s 2011 twelve-point, 
‘Revised Academic Consensus Definition of Terrorism’, would doubtless prove problematic 
for some scholars for it allows for the state perpetration of terrorism; the capacity of states to 
commit terrorism is a bone of contention in the field (Schmid, 2012; Jarvis and Lister, 2014).  
Furthermore, as Ariel Merari points out, Schmid’s analysis of definitions draws largely on the 
                                                          
1 With regard to the definition of terrorism, an oft-quoted anecdote in the literature on terrorism recounts the 
response of US Justice Potter Stewart when in 1964 he was asked to make a ruling based on what constituted 
‘pornography’.  Stewart was unable to define pornography but argued, ‘I know it when I see it’; (Laqueur, 
2009). 
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work of Western academics and policy experts; it is likely that non-Western authors have 
different points of view (Merari, 2016). Despite the proliferation of definitions in the 
literature, few scholars continue to engage solely in the practice of conceptualising the 
phenomenon (Jackson, 2008).  It is more common for authors to recognise the difficulty in 
defining terrorism before they appropriate a definition that they find most suitable for their 
own purposes, with a few tweaks here and there.2 Ondrej Ditrych is thus correct in his 
assessment that scholars’ lamentations over the difficulty of defining their object have 
become a meaningless ritual (Ditrych, 2014).  
Definitions of terrorism have tended to speak to the concerns of the present.  Much 
research in the field has stemmed from the desire of governments, policy experts, and 
academics to ‘solve’ the problem of extremist Islamist terror that confronts us today.  Yet 
historians are now beginning to take a greater interest in terrorism.  Martin A. Miller’s 2013 
The Foundations of Modern Terrorism, for example, tackles the history of the subject from 
the point of view of both sub-state and state terror (Miller, 2013).  The 2014 Routledge 
History of Terrorism has become an essential starting point for any student of terrorism (Law, 
2014).    The essays in this collection examine not only historical examples of terrorist 
violence but also a number of conceptual challenges, too.  Beyond these broad overviews of 
terrorism, Richard Bach Jensen’s The Battle against Anarchist Terrorism (2013) offers a 
comprehensive international account of the campaign against anarchist violence in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.  Meanwhile, scholars in other fields continue to 
write histories of the phenomenon: the contributors to the 2004 Histoire du terrorisme de 
l’antiquité à Daech (translated into English in 2007 and further expanded in 2016) were 
                                                          
2 For example, Appelbaum writes, ‘To the minimal definition of terrorism proposed by Laqueur, “the systematic 
use of murder, injury, and destruction, or the threat of such acts, aimed at achieving political ends’, I am adding 
another minimal condition: criminality coupled with justifiability”, (Appelbaum, 2015).  
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drawn from the fields of strategic and security studies, psychology, medicine, and ethnology, 
as well as from history (Chaliand and Blin, 2004). 
Historical work has largely adopted the long-established method of defining the 
phenomenon before looking for it in history.  Even when a new definition of terrorism is not 
proffered, an attempt to reduce the various definitions to a handful of essential components is 
attempted, with differing results.3  Yet if many researchers have asked ‘how can we define 
terrorism?’, fewer have posed the question, ‘should we define terrorism?’ The practice of 
defining an object entails certain problems that too few scholars in the field of terrorism 
studies recognise in their work.   As Kevin Passmore writes, ‘historians must define the 
boundaries of their object of study, but they must remember that they choose these limits 
from many possibilities.  Since their object does not exist prior to studying it, it can have no 
essential quality’ (Passmore, 2013).  Scholars of terrorism – including historians - frequently 
arrive at a definition of their subject in the present and project this definition back through 
history.  The inherent assumption is that terrorism is an objective phenomenon that can be 
observed in any time and place if only we have the right tools to do so; we in the present will 
know terrorism when we see it in the past.  Johannes Dillinger, for example, uses a definition 
of terrorism ‘widely accepted by criminologists and law enforcement agencies’ to 
characterise early modern arsonists as terrorists.  Dillinger recognises the anachronism in his 
approach but argues that it could help to reveal the ‘true scope of terrorism and terrorist 
scares as historical phenomena’ (Dillinger, 2006).  This approach prioritises presentist 
notions of terrorism when the concern of historians should be to illuminate and explore the 
                                                          
3 Ariel Merari claims that, ‘[t]here are three common elements in the definitions [of terrorism]: (1) the use of 
violence; (2) political objectives; and (3) the intention of sowing fear in a target population’ (Merari, 2016).  On 
the other hand, Jussi M. Hanhimäki and Bernhard Blumenau determine that the three features of terrorism are 
‘a) the use or threat of violence; b) the victims of terrorist acts are often chosen at random to cause an impact; 
c) the intention to create psychological effects beyond the immediate targets; and d) a political change 
(normally by groups that lack influence or power) is expected to follow the act’ (Hanhimäki and Blumenau, 
2013) . 
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understandings and attitudes of the past.  Too few historians of terrorism recognise both the 
essentialism in their definitions and the ahistorical nature of a method that perceives terrorist 
history stretching far back into the mists of time, before even the word itself was first spoken.    
Historians must abandon the practice of defining terrorism.  To define and to label is 
an act that too often permits the voice of the present to drown out that of the past and we 
cannot count on the fact that people in the past recognised terrorism as we do today.  We 
must take our lead instead from the ways in which historical actors understood terrorism and 
to whom and to what they applied the term.  This approach will free us not only from 
essentialism but also from the moral quandary that can obstruct historical inquiry.  Such is the 
power of the word ‘terrorist’ to undermine and delegitimise its object that to apply it to 
historical groups who fought for a just cause is controversial.  Consequently, acts of violence 
have gone unexamined or reframed to fit a more palatable definition at the expense of 
enquiry into historical understandings of terrorism.  With this in mind, this article re-
examines understandings of terrorism in wartime France, when both the Occupier and the 
Resistance used violence labelled ‘terrorist’.     
 
I 
‘Terrorism’ as a term was first used – and in a positive sense - to describe the French 
Revolution’s régime de la terreur that would weed out and eliminate counter-revolutionaries.  
Following the fall of Maximilien Robespierre in July 1794, the aims and methods of 
terrorism were discredited. A year later, Anglo-Irish writer and politician Edmund Burke’s 
polemic against the Revolution and ‘those Hell hounds called Terrorists’ ensured that 
terrorism was thenceforth understood, in English as in French, as a heinous crime (Hoffman, 
2006; Laqueur, 2012; Townshend, 2002).   
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However, scholars have determined that the history of terrorism – or what they 
consider to be terrorism – stretches back further than 1793.  Andrew Sinclair perceives 
terrorism in the mythical stories of Achilles and Hector (Sinclair, 2003).  Randall D. Law’s 
2009 Terrorism: A History is more specific: the first act of historical terrorism occurred in 
647 BCE when Assyrian emperor Assurnasirpla II terrorised the city of Susa.  The Assyrians’ 
brutal murder of the Susa rebels was, according to Law, the ‘first time in recorded history’ 
that violence had been used to send a message; the communicative function of this violence 
thus marks it out as terrorist (Law, 2009).  Steven Pinker, on the other hand, locates the 
origins of terrorism some 700 years later in the murderous campaign of the Sicarii assassins 
in Judea (Pinker, 2011).  Other scholars are less specific with their dating of terrorism: for 
Pamala L. Griset and Sue Mahan, ‘to study the history of terrorism is to study the history of 
human civilization’, while Gérard Chaliand and Arnaud Blin determine that terrorism ‘is 
probably as old as war itself’ (Griset and Mahan, 2003; Chaliand and Blin, 2016).   
From these beginnings, scholars have identified terrorism during the ancient, 
medieval, and early modern periods.  Between the seventh and thirteenth centuries the Thugs 
went on a murderous rampage, inspired by a reinterpretation of Hinduism and killing 
hundreds of thousands of people through strangulation.  Meanwhile, the Assassins posed a 
threat to the Turkish Seljuk empire in Peria and Syria between 1090 and 1275 (Hoffman, 
2006; Rapoport, 2012 (Chaliand and Blion, 2016). The lay reader may be struck by the 
discovery that familiar instances of violence were in fact acts of terrorism; the 1605 
Gunpowder Plot was an instance of ‘religious terrorism’ (Griset and Mahan, 2003).  
The problem with the examples given above is that contemporaries could not possibly 
have conceived of such violence as terrorism for the simple fact that the concept, not to 
mention the word, did not exist.  Only through imposing our own understandings of terrorism 
onto the past can we distinguish these ‘terrorists before the letter’ or, to put it another way, 
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the terrorists-without-knowing-it.  This approach is ahistorical and can lead to instances of 
tortuous reasoning.  Robert Appelbaum’s study of what he defines as terrorism in early 
modern England, Scotland, and France, explains how terrorism could exist before its name: 
‘If you can think terrorism, with or without a word to identify it, then you can think about and 
with it and at the same time support, revile, or defy it; you can do it or defend against it or 
stand aghast at what it has done; you can speculate about it and morally respond to its 
intrusions into the political life of a society’ (Appelbaum, 2015).  
To claim that terrorism can be identified in history before the coining of the term is to 
deny the political and cultural significance and impact of the word.  To label an act of 
violence, a group, or an individual ‘terrorist’ is a political act designed to influence the 
audience.  The labelling relies on a framework of ideas, values, and meanings associated with 
the term at a given moment in time.  Consequently, terrorism is not as old as civilisation 
itself; it is as old as the discourse that invented it and from which it draws its meaning 
(Ditrych, 2014).  This discourse is not fixed; it is multifaceted and subject to prevalent 
national and international influences.  The discourse of terrorism may therefore change but 
the phenomenon of terrorism cannot exist without it; there is no ‘terrorism before the letter’.   
Study of terrorism in the modern era has not escaped the presentism of its ancient, 
medieval, and early modern counterparts.  Michael Burleigh’s 2008 cultural history of 
terrorist violence begins in 1858 with the establishment of the Irish Fenians, the first of 
several groups that Burleigh identifies as most relevant to understanding contemporary 
terrorism (Burleigh, 2008).  Meanwhile, John Merriman’s 2009 The Dynamite Club explains 
how French anarchist Emile Henry, ‘ignited the age of modern terror’, with his 1894 
bombing of a Parisian restaurant (Merriman, 2009).  Conversely, Bruce Hoffman dates 
‘modern, international terrorism’, to 22 July 1968, when gunmen from the Popular Front for 
the Liberation of Palestine hijacked an El Al passenger flight from Rome to Tel Aviv.  From 
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that moment, Hoffman claims, terrorists operated beyond the borders of a particular state, 
seeking to strike their enemy’s assets, installations, and populations wherever they were 
around the world (Hoffman, 2006).   
Since the attacks in New York City on 11 September 2001, the notion of a ‘new’ 
terrorism has emerged.  Peter R. Neumann argues that terrorism after 9/11 assumed a novel 
form because it was perpetrated by transnational networks, inspired by religion, and seeking 
‘mass-casualty attacks against civilians’ with ‘excessive violence’.  Its ‘old’ counterpart – 
which was committed by nationalist or Marxist groups against ‘legitimate targets’ according 
to the ‘rules of engagement’ – was less terrifying (Neumann, 2009).  Texts that do not refer 
explicitly to new terrorism betray the influence of the concept, implying that today’s 
terrorism is more deadly than its antecedents.  The timeline at the beginning of Rosemary HT 
O’Kane’s 2007 Terrorism lists thirteen incidents of terrorism committed around the globe in 
2006 alone, compared to just one terrorist act during the 1890s (anarchist Emile Henry’s 
1894 bombing of the Café Terminus in Paris).  O’Kane, however, does not include in the 
chronology the numerous anarchist attacks committed throughout Europe during the 1880s 
and 1890s, nor does it include the 1886 Chicago Haymarket bombing or the 1901 
assassination of US President William McKinley, all of which were doubtless terrifying to 
contemporaries (O’Kane, 2007).  
‘New’ terrorism has proved a difficult theory to dislodge given that media and 
government alike have presented the threat of twenty-first century terrorism as unprecedented 
in its scale, brutality, and evil (Duyvestyn, 2012).  There has been an ‘avalanche of studies’ 
on Islamic terrorism during 2000-2007 at the expense of work on the manifestations of the 
phenomenon prior to the 1960s; only one in 50 articles published examined historical acts of 
terrorism (Silke, 2009; Ranstorp, 2009).  Even works on historical terrorism can suffer from 
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short-sightedness, perceiving the object of their research as somehow less dangerous than the 
‘hyperterrorists’ of today (Brunelle and Finley-Croswhite, 2010). 
To write the history of terrorism – and avoid the problems inherent to the definitional 
process - we must refocus our attention on historical discourses of terrorism.  In this respect, 
Joseba Zulaika and William A. Douglass’s 1996 Terror and Taboo is salutary.  In this book, 
Zulaika and Douglass deconstruct the discourse of terrorism that emerged in the West during 
the 1970s, arguing that it, ‘becomes more relevant to examine the nature of the behaviour 
labelled “terrorism”, as well as the labelling process itself, rather than to focus upon the 
ostensible “face value” of particular terrorist events and episodes’ (Zulaika and Douglass, 
1996).  Their method may be applied to other periods and subjects in the field of terrorism 
studies.  Several recent works have taken this path.  Lisa Stampnitzky’s excellent 2013 
Disciplining Terror examines the ‘invention’ of the terrorism expert and terrorism studies as 
an academic discipline after the 1970s.  While Stampnitzky’s focus is not on historical 
terrorism, historians should pay attention to her argument that ‘the concept of terrorism is 
socially constructed’(Stampnitzky, 2013).  The search for its ‘true meaning’ is not her 
concern and nor should it be the historian’s.  
Ondrej Ditrych’s 2014 Tracing the Discourses of Terrorism rejects the exercise of 
defining terrorism, ‘[which endows] it with a certain essential and eternal substance’. 
Working on the basis that ‘[t]here is no terrorism beyond the discourse of terrorism’, Ditrych 
examines how states constructed this discourse and its real-world effects on global politics 
(Ditrych, 2014). We should add that non-state actors also produce a discourse of terrorism 
that is constructed according to a political, social, and cultural context, thus contributing to 
historical understandings.  Ditrych’s approach might be attributed to what Richard Jackson 
has called the ‘literary turn’ in terrorism studies.  Accordingly, ‘terrorism’ is a ‘cultural 
construct’ and a ‘social fact’, an ‘empty signifier’ that can be understood only according to 
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‘the way in which it is discursively constructed through language and social practices’, in a 
given context (Jackson, 2015).  The method used in Jackson’s 2007 article on the 
construction of Islamic terrorism in the press and academia is instructive (Jackson, 2007). 
Analysis of how the word was understood and deployed can reveal much about a society 
precisely because ‘terrorism’ is so bound up with temporal political and cultural meaning; it 
is a repository for a diverse set of concerns and ‘a fable of the sinister times in which we live’ 
(Zulaika and Douglass, 1996).    
 
II 
In the history of terrorism, the Second World War presents something of a lacuna.  Histories 
generally make only cursory references to the wartime ‘terrorism’ of the Nazi state and 
resistance groups (for example see Laqueur, 2012; Miller, 2013; Chaliand and Blin, 2016).  
On the other hand, Heinz-Gerhard Haupt and Klaus Weinhauer’s essay on terrorism 
incorporates the partisans of the Second World War into a discussion of anti-colonial 
terrorism between the 1920s and the 1990s.  Haupt and Weinhauer suggest that wartime 
resistance practices exerted a major influence on post-war forms of political violence, 
particularly in blurring the boundary between civilian and combatant (Haupt and Weinhauer, 
2011).   
It is usual to exclude wartime resistance movements from histories of terrorism both 
on scientific grounds – they do not conform to such-or-such a definition of terrorism – and on 
moral grounds – the justness of anti-Nazi violence cannot be compared to the unjust and 
illegitimate violence of terrorism (Pedersen and Holm, 1998). Caoimhe Nic Dháibhéid has 
thus termed the subject of terrorism during wartime ‘vexatious’.  Dháibhéid is aware of the 
potential for controversy with her inclusion of French resister Jean Garcin’s memoir, We 
Were Terrorists, in her 2017 collection of biographies, Terrorist Histories.  Such is her 
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concern that Dháibhéid explains away Garcin’s terrorism with the fact that his actions (and 
those of the French Resistance) have since ‘accrued something of a degree of acceptability, 
whether by virtue of the passage of time or the perceived justification of the motivation’.  
This position leads to the problematic conclusion that Garcin’s acts were ‘political violence’, 
defined as ‘terrorism that has “worked”’ (Dháibhéid, 2017). 
The violence of the French resistance is a blind spot in the historiography of the Dark 
Years.  Research has taken two paths.  Firstly, work has focused on violence perpetrated 
against resisters, rather than violence inflicted by resisters (Piketty, 2008).  To some extent, 
this focus stems from the quality and content of the available sources.  The difficulty with 
which some former resisters related acts of violence means that their testimonies and 
memoirs tend either to exclude such happenings or to recount them in a perfunctory or 
euphemistic manner.  Furthermore, some post-war interviews with resisters who referred to 
violent incidents were redacted and possibly even destroyed (Piketty, 2008; René-Bazin, 
2010). Conversely, the desires of certain individuals and groups to shore up morale during the 
war (not to mention their own resistance credentials after it) prompted exaggeration of 
violence and even its invention (Liaigre, 2015). In his 2015 Fighters in the Shadows, Robert 
Gildea recounts an incident from the archives of resistance fighter Albert Ouzoulias in which 
a communist commando attacked ‘a German parade goose-stepping along the Champs-
Elysées’.  However, Roger Bourderon finds no evidence to corroborate Ouzoulias’s story 
(Gildea, 2015; Bourderon, 2012).  Franck Liaigre, author of an excellent 2015 study of the 
communist Francs-Tireurs et Partisans (FTP), is therefore wary of resistance testimonies, 
hitherto considered ‘sacred’ and ‘incontestable’, for he finds them to be ‘often vague, even 
wrong, guided by political or ideological considerations or the desire to honour the memory 
of lost resisters’ (Liaigre, 2015).  Liaigre’s study instead draws on the archives of Vichy’s 
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police forces, the richness of which he attributes to the unfortunate reality that, once caught, 
resisters talked. 
Secondly, historians have tended to classify the resistance’s armed struggle according 
to military or paramilitary categories such as ‘urban guerrilla’, ‘partisan warfare’, ‘subversive 
warfare’, and ‘civil war’.  The use of the term terrorism to describe resistance violence is 
rejected out of hand because this violence was neither indiscriminate nor directed at civilians 
(Marco et al, 2006; Wieviorka, 2005; Bédarida, 1996). Olivier Wieviorka goes so far as to 
describe the resistance strategy as ‘counterterrorism’ against the terrorist regimes of Vichy 
and the Nazi occupier (Wieviorka, 2016). Ultimately, it is difficult to escape the moral 
question inherent to examining the resistance and its violence.  Historians have thus sought to 
use any label but ‘terrorism’ (Merari, 2016).   
Both the Vichy regime and the Nazis denounced resisters as terrorists.  While we 
could dismiss this label as propaganda (which it surely was), in doing so we would fail to 
consider contemporary understandings of wartime terrorism and what they may reveal to us.  
It was under the Vichy regime that the term “terrorism” first appeared in French law.  On 5 
June 1943, Marshall Pétain’s regime established special sections within appeal courts for the 
trial of crimes that promoted or encouraged, “terrorism, communism, anarchy, social or 
national subversion,” or, “rebellion against the established social order”, punishable by forced 
labour or death (“Loi no. 318 du 5 juin 1943,” 1943).  Vichy’s Minister of Justice Maurice 
Gabode stated that in the context of growing resistance violence the threat of civil war was 
real; he thus sought to ensure that magistrates came down hard on “terrorists” (Sansico, 
2016).  In January 1944, the crimes of assassination, murder, attempted assassination and 
attempted murder, and acts that would “promote terrorist activities” were rendered liable for 
court martial (“Loi no. 38 du 20 janvier 1944,” 1944).  The law now provided for the 
immediate execution of people caught in the process of committing such a crime or in cases 
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where the culpability of the suspect was plain.  Vichy’s laws did not define terrorism and the 
application of the term remained at the discretion of the authorities.   
One perceives in the collaborationist press an understanding of terrorism as an un-
French act committed at the behest of a hostile foreign government.  In December 1941, Paul 
Marion’s General Secretariat for Information, argued that terrorism threatened peace, the 
internal unity of the country, and the rebirth of France.  The counter-terrorist struggle was 
thus framed as the patriotic duty of all French against foreigners and traitors directed from 
Moscow or London (“Pour sauvegarder l’avenir de la France,” 1941).  Nevertheless, 
collaborators understood resistance terrorism in complex ways.  In March 1944, a senior 
official in Vichy’s paramilitary police force, the Milice, noted with some dissatisfaction that 
officers tended to distinguish between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ terrorists; the former were likely 
Gaullists, the latter communists (Azéma, 1990). 
The relationship between resisters and terrorism was complex, too.  In a 2003 
interview, former resister Raymond Aubrac asked the questions, “Were the resisters terrorists 
because they fought in illegality?  Was their combat legitimate because it was illegal?” The 
interview took place in the wake of the 9/11 attacks, at a time when “terrorism” had taken on 
a renewed sense of illegitimacy.  However, Aubrac, who understood a clear difference 
between the indiscriminate violence of the Occupier and the guerrilla of the resistance 
movements, did not reject the term: “I am proud to have been baptised a ‘terrorist’ by my 
enemies” (Aubrac, 2003).  
During the Dark Years, few resisters accepted the term as readily as Aubrac did in 
2003.  One finds in the clandestine press a concerted campaign to combat Vichy’s accusation 
of terrorism against the resistance movements.  Resisters understood the power of the word to 
smear its target.  Vichy’s propaganda was “an evil all the more contagious for it plays above 
all with words” (“Pour le maquis… contre le terrorisme,” n.d).  It was feared that Vichy’s 
14 
 
campaign was gaining traction with members of the public.  With details of “terrorist” crimes 
published daily in the press, “terrorism” was a frightening spectre about which everyone was 
speaking, whether they had witnessed an incident of violence or not (“Pour le maquis,” n.d). 
The Conseil National de la Résistance (CNR) was concerned enough to issue a statement 
denying that resistance actions constituted terrorism (“La campagne contre le ‘terrorisme’,” 
1943).  
Given the perceived potency of Vichy’s propaganda resistance groups sought to 
combat the regime’s rhetoric.  A group in Marseille urged readers to challenge Vichy’s 
terrorism discourse wherever they encountered it, “in conversations, on the train, in queues, 
at the cinema, etc” (L’aube de la Liberté, 1944).  The underground press threw the enemy’s 
words back at him, labelling the actions of both the Etat français and the German Occupier as 
terrorist (Coup d’oeil sur la presse libre, 1944).  Such discourse perhaps reflected the fact 
that some movements rejected the use of violence.  Even the communist party, which would 
later endorse guerrilla warfare against the Occupier, did not admit responsibility for its 
attacks until summer 1942.  Until that point the party had described certain acts of violent 
resistance (such as the August 1941 killing of German soldier Moser by Pierre Georges in a 
Parisian Metro station) as either a response to German provocation or the result of internecine 
conflict between collaborators (Wieviorka, 2013; Liaigre, 2015). Resistance groups worked 
to reframe their own violence in a more palatable fashion, as military operations.  Attacks 
were described as “authentic acts of war” committed by an elite of soldiers and “all French 
worthy of the name” (“Le fait de la résistance,”1943; “Nous, les terroristes.,” 1943).   
According to the CNR’s statement in November 1943, resisters were not terrorists but 
“courageous patriots who harass the Occupier’s troops, destroy his munitions dumps, obstruct 
his war production and punish his accomplices” (“La campagne contre le ‘terrorisme’,” 
1943).  Emma Kathryn Kuby has suggested that the effort to frame resistance violence as a 
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‘combat operation’, was rooted in a male desire to reclaim a semblance of masculinity after 
the defeat of 1940.  Extra-legal violence took on an aura of legitimacy as long as it was 
committed in the name of masculine values such as justice, rather than the feminised passions 
of hatred and rage (Kuby, 2011).  A gendered history of resistance violence awaits to be 
written.  At this point, however, we may point to similar gendered understandings of 
acceptable and unacceptable violence in interwar France and earlier (Millington, 2014).  
Contrary to Vichy’s portrayal of the resisters as bandits operating in the shadows, the groups 
attempted to legitimise their violence by framing it as precise and surgical, aimed solely at 
the Nazis and their French lackeys. 
However, the resistance’s rejection of the terrorist label was not total; several groups 
were unafraid to publicise the violence of their action.  Libération was willing to claim 
responsibility for “terrorist” attacks: “[Vichy’s] publicity does not displease us.  In 
“terrorism”, there is terror: [the terror] that we inspire.”  Nevertheless, the newspaper was 
still careful to frame the violence as “legal,” and part of an “underground war” for liberation 
(“‘Terrorisme’ et insurrection nationale,” 1943).  According to the founder of Défense de la 
France, Philippe Viannay, in 1943 the desperation of the hour presented a choice for all 
French: to fight or to desert one’s duty as a Frenchman.  “Against those who refuse to fight,” 
he continued, “we will use, if necessary, TERROR.”  This terror involved the assassination of 
collaborators and police officers.  As for the mouchards (informers), “A FRENCHMAN 
WHO SELLS OUT ANOTHER FRENCHMAN DESERVES TO BE TORTURED” 
(Indomitus [Philippe Viannay], 1943).  Combat followed a similar line.  The so-called 
“terrorists” were nothing of the sort; in fact, legality rested with them as the “upholders of the 
law.”  Those who were executed in “terrorist” attacks were simply paying for their crimes 
against France (“Terroristes? Non: Justiciers!,” 1943).  Terrorism was thus understood as a 
crime visited upon France from abroad.  It was both the violence of French traitors in the pay 
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of Moscow or London, and French traitors operating at the behest of Vichy and Berlin.  
Whichever side one was on, war could be waged in the name of France; terrorism could not.  
This may have significant implications for the framing of the terrorist threat in the post-war 
years, not to mention current French debates about citizenship, immigration, and terrorism.   
There are grounds, therefore, to revisit the subject of terrorism in wartime France.  
We must do so not from the starting point of a definition of terrorism.  We must analyse the 
use of the term in its context, the meanings and representations that it signified, and the 
contest over its application as a label.  To do so is not to brand the resistance as terrorist but 
to take seriously the attitudes and beliefs of contemporaries and to seek to explain these.  This 
is even more important given that Vichy’s propaganda campaign was to some extent 
successful: twenty-five years after the Liberation former resisters complained that their 
neighbours considered them still to be little better than bandits and terrorists (Johnston, 
1975).  To ascribe a military character to resistance violence is to believe only the self-
representation of resisters.  In fact, their violence was understood in a multitude of ways.  For 
some French, the resistance did indeed practice terrorism.   
 
III 
To write the history of terrorism is to reconstruct the representations and meanings of the 
phenomenon in the past.  Past understandings of terrorism are evident in the official 
documents of states and the private and public discussions of cabinets and law-making 
bodies; all reveal implicit and explicit knowledge of what terrorism was thought to be at the 
time.  The historic press is an invaluable source because, as today, newspapers spilled much 
ink over terrorism (Jackson et al, 2011). The media recreated terrorist acts for public 
consumption, placing the event in its perceived historical context (usually as the latest in a 
series of supposedly linked attacks) and explaining it according to prevailing attitudes to, and 
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understandings of, terrorism and other attendant matters (Mannoni and Bonardi, 2003).  
Cultural productions such as novels and films further help to reconstruct popular attitudes to 
terrorism (Laqueur, 1977).  Each text must be ‘examined for the labels, assumptions, 
narratives, predicates, metaphors, inferences and arguments they deployed and the kinds of 
existing cultural-political narratives and pre-existing texts they drew upon’ (Jackson, 2007). 
To whom, to what, and to what end did people in the past apply the terms terrorism and 
terrorist?  Which groups or individuals escaped the label?  What values and assumptions did 
the term contain?  In what contexts was it deployed?  These are but a few questions that 
historians may begin with.  We must be prepared for the disappointing discovery that past 
societies disagreed as much as our own over the definition of terrorism.  This was as true of 
the instruments of state as of individual citizens (Saul, 2006).  The sites and the stakes of 
such contests must be examined. 
Two problems may arise from the approach to historical terrorism outlined above.  
Firstly, we must confront the contentious matter of state terrorism.  To foreground past 
understandings is to appreciate that state violence may be understood as terrorist only when 
historical actors perceived it to be such.  The results may disappoint those scholars who 
desire to reveal the hypocrisy of Western states whose use of the term terrorism is founded on 
politics and ideology.  However, historians can investigate, too, how states have controlled 
the discourse of terrorism and against whom they employed it.    
Secondly, we may encounter terrorism where we do not wish to see it.  As Dháibhéid 
writes, ‘the term “terrorist” has accrued a nigh-inescapable value judgement’; to use it is to 
blacken, to tarnish, and to undermine (Dháibhéid, 2017). The power of the state to influence 
perceptions of terrorism means that people in the past may have applied the term to groups 
which, today, we would not consider (nor dare consider) to be terrorist.  The historian may 
escape such value judgements with a focus on historic discourses of the phenomenon; this 
18 
 
approach opens avenues of investigation that may previously have been left unexamined.  We 
cannot of course escape the understandings of terrorism of the age in which we live (the 
‘know it when we see it’ factor).  However, we should remember that historical actors 
likewise knew terrorism when they saw it.   
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